Abstract. We show that the polynomial translation of the classical propositional normal modal logic S4 into the intuitionistic propositional logic Int from Fernández is incorrect. We give a modified translation and prove its correctness, and provide implementations of both translations to allow others to test our results. §1. Introduction. It is well known that the validity and satisfiability problems for the classical propositional normal modal logic S4 and the intuitionistic propositional logic Int are pspace-complete and thus there must exist a polynomial translation from each into the other. The Gödel translation [2] provides a translation from Int into S4, but the only published polynomial translation from S4 into Int we could find is by Fernández [1] . Here, we first show that the translation is incorrect. By pinpointing the flaws, we give a correct polynomial translation from S4 into Int.
§1. Introduction. It is well known that the validity and satisfiability problems for the classical propositional normal modal logic S4 and the intuitionistic propositional logic Int are pspace-complete and thus there must exist a polynomial translation from each into the other. The Gödel translation [2] provides a translation from Int into S4, but the only published polynomial translation from S4 into Int we could find is by Fernández [1] . Here, we first show that the translation is incorrect. By pinpointing the flaws, we give a correct polynomial translation from S4 into Int.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we define the syntax and Kripke semantics of the propositional intuitionistic logic Int and of the propositional normal modal logic S4. In Section 3 we show that the original translation is incorrect. In Section 4, we give our solution and prove it correct. §2. Semantic Preliminaries. We define Int-formulae from an infinite set P rop of propositional variables using the following BNF grammar where p ∈ P rop and ⊥ is the falsum constant:
We also define ¬ϕ = (ϕ → ⊥). We use rooted Kripke models of Int which are structures M = (W, R, L, r) where: W is a non-empty set of possible worlds; R is a reflexive, transitive and antisymmetric binary relation on W ; the valuation L : P rop → 2 W obeys persistence: if w ∈ L(p) and R(w, v) then v ∈ L(p); and r ∈ W is a root world such that ∀w ∈ W.R(r, w) holds. Since Int enjoys the finite model property, we can restrict ourselves to models where W is finite.
The semantics of Int are given in Figure 1 . An Int-formula ϕ is Int-satisfiable if there exists some Int-model M and some world w in that Int-model such that M, w ϕ. An Int-formula is Int-valid if ¬ϕ is not Int-satisfiable. That is, an Int-formula is Int-valid if every world w in every Int-model M obeys M, w ϕ. We define S4-formulae over an infinite set P rop of propositional variables using the following BNF grammar where p ∈ P rop and ⊥ is the falsum constant:
Again we define ¬ϕ = (ϕ → ⊥). We can also define ♦ϕ = (¬ ¬ϕ). For S4, Kripke models are structures M = (W, R, L, r) where: W is a non-empty set of possible worlds; R is a reflexive and transitive binary relation on W ; L : P rop → 2 W is a valuation; and r ∈ W is a root world obeying ∀w ∈ W.R(r, w). The semantics of S4 are given in Figure 2 . An S4-formula ϕ is S4-satisfiable if there exists some S4-model M and some world w in that S4-model such that M, w
ϕ. An S4-formula is S4-valid if ¬ϕ is not S4-satisfiable. That is, an S4-formula is S4-valid if every world w in every S4-model M obeys M, w ϕ.
We can restrict this class further because S4 is complete with respect to the class of binary, reflexive and transitive Kripke frames which are rooted finite trees of finite clusters of worlds where, within a cluster, all worlds are related to each other. §3. Translating S4-formulae into Int-formulae. If N is the number of -symbols that appear in an S4 formula ϕ, then we can restrict ourselves to those frames with at most N + 1 distinct clusters along any branch, and each cluster has at most N + 1 worlds. In such a frame, we say that the level of a world is the number of clusters between the root and the cluster containing that world. If the world is in the root cluster, then it has level 0.
To represent such S4-frames, the translation of Fernández [1] creates multiple Int-propositions p i j for each S4-proposition p in the S4-formula, intended to represent the valuation of the S4-proposition p in a world with level i, using j to distinguish between worlds within a cluster in the given S4-model. Figure 3 gives the Int -formula (ψ) n m which represents the valuation of the S4-formula ψ at the m th world in a cluster n clusters from the root in the S4-model. The branching of the Int-model allows for multiple clusters with level n in the S4-model.
The translation also makes use of new Int-propositions l i intended to indicate the level of an S4-cluster, and new Int-propositions b i ψ to indicate when the S4 -formula ψ holds at a cluster of level i.
To determine S4-validity, Fernández [1] defines the translation ϕ
Int
o , written with an extra subscript o for "original", as shown in Figure 4 . The claim is that ϕ Int o is Int-valid iff ϕ is S4-valid. However, there are two errors in this encoding. First, consider a formula ϕ of S4 with no -formulae. In this case, N = 0, and so Lev(ϕ) = (l 0 ∧ ¬l 0 ), leading The second error is more subtle, and we demonstrate it via an example. Figure 5 , where underlines indicate the parts that are "true" at w and which directly affect the truth value of the larger formulae, we obviously have M, w Lev(ϕ). We have M, w Mid n (ϕ) because in a single-world model, ψ ∨ ¬ψ is intuitionistically true for all ψ. Since M, w l 1 , we have M, w Box The culprits are the "escape hatches" l n+1 in Box n o,ψ(ϕ) and l k+1 in A n o,ψ (ϕ), which allow us to ignore constraints imposed by l 0 by jumping straight to l 1 . What happens if we keep the original definition of N and just drop the l N part from Lev(ϕ)? Example 1 is no longer a counter-example, but using ϕ = ( p → p) ∧ ( q → q) with exactly the same structure does give a counterexample. §4. Solution. As mentioned before, the first step of the solution is to modify N to be one more than the number of -formulae in the given S4-formula ϕ. This is probably what was intended, as no proofs need to change and there are no 0-standard models, as defined by Fernández [1] . To avoid confusion, we will retain N as the number of -symbols, as used by Fernández [1] , and use M = N + 1 for the modified value.
The second change is to modify the definition of A n o,ψ and Box n o,ψ as follows: 4.1. Converting Int-models to S4-models. We work with rooted and finite Int-models M = (W, R, L, r). We intend to show that the modified ϕ Int c has an Int-countermodel iff ϕ has an S4-countermodel.
First, we prove some lemmas about small modifications to Int-models.
, a world u ∈ W , and a finite set L of propositional variables such that ∀w ∈ W, ∀p ∈ L, if R(w, u) and
That is, we insert a new world v as an immediate predecessor of u, where all proper predecessors y of u are made proper predecessors of v and all successors x of u including u itself are made successors of v.
is an Int-model with a world u, and L is a set of propositional variables falsified at all y such that R(y, u) and y = u, then M = insert(L, u, M) is an Int-model and for all Int-formulae ψ which do not include propositions from L and for all w ∈ W , we have M , w ψ iff M, w ψ, and additionally we have M , v ψ iff M, u ψ.
Proof. We first prove that M is still an Int -model. That is, we have to prove that M is transitive, reflexive, antisymmetry and persistence. Of these, we deal only with the non-trivial cases.
Transitivity still holds: the only case that could possibly fail is R (a, b) and R (b, v) but not R (a, v) for some a = v and b = v. Since both a and b are in the original model, the edge R (a, b) is from the original model, hence R(a, b). Since R (b, v), we must have R(b, u) and b = u by definition of R . By the transitivity of R we must have R(a, u), and thus by definition of R we must have R (a, v) as required.
The valuation L obeys the persistence property: because the original model had a persistent valuation, the only way for M to not have a persistent valuation is if the introduction of v changed something. Suppose for a contradiction that for some proposition p and some world w we have
Since R(u, w), the original M does not satisfy persistence, giving a contradiction. Suppose then that R (w, v) and w ∈ L (p) and v ∈ L (p). Then we must have R(w, u) and
, and the persistence of M implies that w ∈ L(p), and hence w ∈ L (p): contradiction. Thus M is an Int-model. Now we prove by structural induction on ψ that we must have M, u ψ iff M , v ψ, and M, w ψ iff M , w ψ. First the base cases: ψ = p: Since p appears in ψ, we must have p ∈ L and so by Definition 2.6
Now the step cases, using the following inductive hypotheses: IH1: for all subformulae φ of ψ we have M, u φ iff M , v φ, IH2: for all subformulae φ of ψ and for all worlds w ∈ W we have M, w φ iff M , w φ.
so by IH1 we have M , v ψ 1 and M , v ψ 2 , and thus
, 2}, and so M , v ψ i and therefore M , v ψ 1 ∧ ψ 2 .
Similarly M, w ψ 1 ∧ ψ 2 iff M, w ψ 1 and M, w ψ 2 , which by IH2 holds iff M , w ψ 1 and M , w ψ 2 and thus M , w ψ 1 ∧ψ 2 as required. ψ = ψ 1 ∨ ψ 2 : Similar to the above.
and M, w ψ 1 then M, w ψ 2 . For these w (which does not include v) by IH2, if M , w ψ 1 then we also have M , w ψ 2 . Finally it follows from IH1 that if M , v ψ 1 then M , v ψ 2 because the same held for u.
Suppose instead that
Effectively Lemma 3 states that we can insert "copies" of worlds with minor changes to some atomic propositions L without changing the truth values of formulae which do not refer to those atomic propositions.
Next we prove that if our amended ϕ Int c has an Int-countermodel, then ϕ has an S4-countermodel.
is an Int-model such that M, r P (ϕ), then for w ∈ W , let Lv(w) be defined as the index i such that w ∈ L(l i ) and w ∈ L(l i+1 ).
As long as M, w Lev(ϕ) then Lv(w) has a unique definition because then we must have M, w l 0 and thus Lv(w) ≥ 0, and we must have M, w l M and thus Lv(w) < M , and we must have that if M, w l k then M, w l j for all j < k. another (necessarily different) world u such that R(w, u) and R(u, v) with Lv(u) = Lv(w) + 1; and 3. if for some w, u ∈ W we have R(w, u) and Lv(w) = Lv(u) then w = u.
We now prove that there must be a stratified Int-countermodel to ϕ That is, u is a copy of v, added between w and v with the valuation only differing on the level variables in L. Note that Lv(u) = j + 1 because l j+1 ∈ L and so M , u l j+1 , but l j+2 ∈ L so M , u l j+2 . A similar argument to Lemma 6 applies, again using Lemma 3. The structure M is an Int-model, the truth of formulae which do not refer to l k ∈ L does not change between M and M , and the truth of the formulae which do refer to l k ∈ L is preserved because the l k are falsified on the left of an implication. Let the "gap" between a world x and one of its immediate successors y be defined as Lv(y) − Lv(x) − 1 if Lv(y) > Lv(x), and 0 if Lv(y) = Lv(x). The sum of these gaps is unchanged between M and M except that for the gaps between v and the immediate predecessors of v. The gap between w and u is 0, while the gaps between u and the previous immediate successors of w is decreased by 1, so the total sum of the gaps decreases through this process. Since our Int-models are finite we repeat the process until condition 2 holds. Note that because the original model satisfies Condition 1, and because we do not change the root (we add a world in between two other existing worlds) the model M must still satisfy Condition 1.
Note that this may break Condition 3, since the world v may already have a predecessor x with level j + 1, but x is not a successor of w. When we introduce the new world u we make u a successor of x, which causes Condition 3 to fail. There must be a pair of "adjacent" worlds w and u such that Lv(w) = Lv(u), R(w, u), w = u and there is no distinct v such that R(w, v) and R(v, u). We show that we get closer to satisfying condition 3 by removing the edge R(w, u).
The relation R is still transitive because R was, and there is no "intermediate" world v that could require the removed edge. Reflexivity and antisymmetry are also preserved.
Suppose that M, r P (ϕ), but M , r P (ϕ). The only change is the removal of R(w, u), so it is simple to see that M Lev(ϕ) and M M id n (ϕ). Therefore we must have M Box , and so M is a countermodel with at least one fewer instance of Condition 3 failing. Since Int has the finite model property we can begin with a finite model (and a finite number of failures of conditon 3) and repeat the process until condition 3 holds. Since we only remove edges between worlds with the same level, we do not break either Condition 1 or Condition 2 if they hold initially.
Corollary
We now show how Int-countermodels of ϕ Int c correspond to S4-countermodels of ϕ following Fernández [1] but being mindful of our modifications.
Int , let x = {x 0 , . . . , x M −1 } be a set of M distinct worlds, and let W Int →S4 be the disjoint union of all
and We will use the same notion of N -standard frames as Fernández [1] , though we refer to it as M -standard to avoid confusion between the N used by Fernández [1] and the M = N + 1 that we use. If K = (W, R) is an S4-frame, then let x denote the R-equivalence class of worlds {y | (x, y) ∈ R and (y, x) ∈ R}. The quotient W/R with induced relation R forms a partial order since R is transitive and reflexive, and taking the quotient ensures that it is antisymmetric as well. Thus if there is a countermodel to ϕ, then there is an M -standard counter-
) be such a model. Let Lv(x) be the length of the shortest chain R(r S4 , w 1 ), R(w 1 , w 2 ), . . . , R(w n−1 , x) where each w i is distinct, and there is no intermediate such that R(w i , u) and R(u, w i+1 ). We now define an Int-model which is a countermodel to ϕ
, where 
Proof. Much of the proof is the same as for Lemma 11. The only difference is for -formulae.
By the definition of
) iff M S4 , w 0 ψ 1 , and thus M S4 , w m ψ 1 since w 0 and w m must have the same set of successors.
, as required.
We also have M S4 →Int , w l 0 , since Lv(w) ≥ 0. Also, because the models are M -standard, the maximum chain length is M − 1, thus Lv(w) < M and so Remark 20. We might ask where Fernández [1] goes awry; where does the purported proof fail? The theorems and lemmas presented there appear to be correct, and yet Example 1 demonstrates that the original translation is wrong.
The problem is with his application of his Theorem 4.1, which is our Lemma 11. The theorem states that worlds in the constructed S4-model satisfy the same formulae as the worlds in the original Int-model of the same level. The assumption that Fernández [1] makes is effectively that the original Int-models are stratified, and in particular that the root of the Int-countermodel has level 0. If this is the case, then applying his Theorem 4.1 will indeed result in an S4-model where the root falsifies ϕ, because the Int-model falsifies (ϕ) 0 0 . What we illustrated with Example 1 was that this assumption does not always hold for the original definition of ϕ Int o , and indeed because his Theorem 4.1 is correct the example cannot be "fixed" into a stratified model.
By changing the translation as we have, we are able to prove that all models of the modified translation can be converted into stratified models according to Corollary 9, and then Fernández's original proofs only require slight changes to account for the changed translation to prove that this new translation is in fact correct. Our Lemmas 6 to 8 which we use to prove Corollary 9 are the bulk of the new work here, and they do not hold for the original translation.
An implementation of our translation is available at the URL below:
http://users.cecs.anu.edu.au/~rpg/S4ToInt/ There are also options to apply the original translation ϕ 
